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Invited Paper: 
THE ROLE OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN WILDLIFE SCIENCE 
DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON,1 U.S. Geological Survey, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center, Jamestown, ND 58401, USA 
Abstract: Statistical testing of null hypotheses recently has come under fire in wildlife sciences (Cherry 1998; John- 
son 1999; Anderson et al. 2000, 2001). In response to this criticism, Robinson and Wainer (2002) provide some fur- 
ther background information on significance testing; they argue that significance testing in fact is useful in certain 
situations. I counter by suggesting that such situations rarely arise in our field. I agree with Robinson and Wainer 
that replication is the key to scientific advancement. I believe, however, that significance testing and resulting P- 
values frequently are confused with issues of replication. Any single study can yield a P-value, but only consistent 
results from truly replicated studies will advance our understanding of the natural world. 
JOURNAL OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 66(2):272-276 
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The wildlife literature recently has hosted a 
number of articles critical of the statistical testing 
of null hypotheses (hereafter, significance test- 
ing). Cherry (1998),Johnson (1999), and Ander- 
son et al. (2000, 2001) argued that the practice is 
applied too often and inappropriately. Scientists 
in other disciplines have had similar discussions 
(seeJohnson 1999 for references). Robinson and 
Wainer (2002; hereafter RW) provide some histo- 
ry of significance testing and its background. 
Understanding how significance testing arose is 
helpful in appreciating its strengths and weak- 
nesses. Robinson and Wainer further offer some 
examples intended to illustrate situations in 
which significance testing of null hypotheses can 
be appropriate. I agree with much of what RW 
say. In fact, they restate and reinforce many of the 
points made in articles to which they are 
responding. For example, their emphasis on R. 
A. Fisher's view of the importance of replication 
is consistent with points made byJohnson (1999). 
While I do not dispute most of the points RW 
make, I question whether some of these points 
have utility to the wildlife profession. In this com- 
mentary, I focus on the issues on which I do not 
fully concur with RW. I offer comments of 2 types: 
(1) general responses to RW, and (2) remarks 
related to the points made by RW as they specifi- 
cally apply to wildlife situations. 
GENERAL RESPONSES 
Robinson and Wainer (2002) claim to have seen 
no evidence that significance testing is misused 
1 E-mail: Douglas_HJohnson@usgs.gov 
any more often than any other statistical proce- 
dure. Exact numbers would be difficult to calcu- 
late, but by its very nature, significance testing of 
null hypotheses must be misused more than other 
procedures. This is true because significance test- 
ing is integral to the misuse of most other proce- 
dures. For example, perhaps the most easily mis- 
used statistical procedure is stepwise regression 
(e.g., Draper et al. 1971, Pope and Webster 1972, 
Hurvich and Tsai 1990, Thompson 1995). Step- 
wise regression includes or excludes variables in 
a model depending on their P-values. That is, 
model selection is based on tests of hypotheses 
that the effect of individual explanatory variables 
on a response variable is zero, given the other 
explanatory variables already included in the 
model. A second kit of statistical tools that are 
readily misused are multivariate methods (Arm- 
strong 1967, Johnson 1981, Rexstad et al. 1988). 
Again, a key aspect involving their misuse is based 
on significance tests; multivariate procedures 
permit a plethora of null hypotheses to be tested. 
Other examples could be cited, but the mere fact 
that significance tests are central to so many sta- 
tistical procedures per force implies that they are 
misused more than any single procedure. 
As an example of misused statistics, RW suggest 
that the mean is inappropriate when the under- 
lying distribution contains outliers. That statement 
may be true in some instances, but not in others; 
the appropriateness of any statistical procedure 
depends on the objective of the analysis. Consider 
an example involving a known population of 51 
pheasant hunters in a county. I will simplify the 
example by supposing that 25 of them get no birds 
during the season, 25 of them bag 1 bird each, and 
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a single individual shoots 179 birds. The mean bag 
is 4 birds. The median bag is 1 bird. Which of these 
2 measures of central tendency is more appropri- 
ate? If the objective is to characterize the typical 
hunter, then the median (1 bird) clearly portrays 
the harvest of this hunter better than the mean 
does. So the median might be the measure of 
choice in a human dimensions study. Suppose, 
however, that interest was in the dynamics of the 
pheasant population. Then we would be con- 
cerned about the total harvest, which is the mean 
bag x the number of hunters. In this situation, the 
mean-not the median-is the appropriate mea- 
sure, even though the distribution contains a wild 
outlier. The blanket statement by RW about the 
propriety of the mean is misleading: the objective 
of a particular investigation must be considered. 
Robinson and Wainer (2002) agree with Guthery 
et al. (2001) that adoption of information-theo- 
retic methods in place of significance testing 
would still involve an arbitrary numerical criteri- 
on to judge the strength of evidence in single 
studies. I disagree. One of the advantages of the 
information-theoretic approach is that it allows a 
set of models to be ranked, based on the support 
each model receives from the data. Further, 
information-theoretic methods lend themselves 
nicely to model averaging (Burnham and Ander- 
son 1998, Anderson et al. 2000). Model averaging 
involves consideration of the full set of meaning- 
ful models that are supported by the data. 
Instead of settling on a single best model, all sup- 
ported models are considered, with weights relat- 
ed to the strength of evidence for each model. 
That process is in stark contrast to what is usually 
done by significance-testing approaches to model 
selection, in which a single model is chosen 
based on tests of null hypotheses that the effects 
of variables are exactly zero. 
Replication 
Robinson and Waiiier (2002) remind us of the 
importance of replication, pointing out R. A. 
Fisher's perspective of science as a continuing 
process. They cite (2002:265) with evident 
approval Fisher's belief that significance testing 
"only made sense in the context of a continuing 
series of experiments that were aimed at con- 
firming the size and direction of the effects of 
specific treatments." They also cite Tukey (1969) 
and note (2002:269) that "statistically significant 
results that are replicated provide the basis of sci- 
entific truth." I wholeheartedly concur. Studies 
conducted to understand phenomena generally 
are of too small a scale to yield results of unques- 
tioned significance. Robinson and Wainer (2002) 
note that Fisher was not concerned with what we 
call Type I errors, claiming an effect to be real 
when it is not; he thought that continued repli- 
cations would demonstrate that the effect was not 
real. In wildlife applications, however, we rarely 
seek to replicate studies. Many studies simply can- 
not be replicated because of conditions that vary 
markedly from 1 occasion to another. Further, we 
often (too often, in my opinion) urge managers 
to take action based on the results of a single 
study. Indeed, authors writing for The Journal of 
Wildlife Management (JWM) are strongly encour- 
aged to include a Management Implications sec- 
tion. The authors call managers to arms based on 
results of their single-probably unreplicated- 
study, in which a Type I error may have occurred. 
This is not the situation Fisher envisaged. 
Johnson (1999) emphasized that replication is 
a cornerstone of science and referred to Carver's 
(1978) point that statistical significance generally 
is interpreted as relating to replication. Johnson 
(1999:768) even noted Fisher's idea of "repeated- 
ly getting results significant at 5%." Key to this 
issue is the comment by Bauernfeind (1968) that 
replicated results automatically make statistical 
significance testing unnecessary. Fisher argued 
that a result significant at 5% provided motiva- 
tion to continue studying the phenomenon. 
Once such a series of experiments has been con- 
ducted, however-and most of them have pro- 
vided P-values less than 0.05-those individual P- 
values are of little relevance. 
In my view, the interpretation of any statistical 
evidence (e.g., P-values, estimated effect sizes, 
confidence intervals) makes sense only if the 
interpretation is grounded in the context of prior 
related findings. Even if no individual study 
obtained statistically significant results-but the 
effect sizes from a series of studies were consis- 
tent-important truth may have been discovered. 
Indeed, proponents of significance testing (e.g., 
Robinson and Levin 1997) and its opponents 
(e.g., Thompson 1996) agree on the importance 
of replication in research. 
Detractors of significance testing, however, 
argue that too many researchers erroneously 
interpret statistical significance as necessary and 
sufficient evidence that results are replicable 
(Cohen 1994). Without statistical significance 
tests, such researchers would be forced to com- 
pare their effect sizes directly with those from 
similar studies or actually to conduct further 
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replicated studies. The researchers also would be 
forced to argue explicitly that their effects are 
practically-as opposed to only statistically-sig- 
nificant. Doing so would be a positive contribu- 
tion to most areas of science. 
Proving the Null Hypothesis 
Robinson and Wainer (2002) note that critics of 
significance testing worry that researchers too 
commonly interpret results with P > 0.05 as indi- 
cating no effect. The critics are right: researchers 
do exactly that. A scan of the first few papers in a 
recent issue of JWM (Volume 65) found several 
examples in which authors determined that there 
was no effect after finding P> 0.05, even if Pjust 
barely exceeded 0.05. Among these instances 
were: "the probability of being detected in at least 
1 month (p*) did not differ from 1 (P> 0.058)"; 
"overlap between female and male core areas dif- 
fered neither in early (U= 30, P= 0.052) nor in late 
spring (U= 51.0, P= 0.144)"; and "Daily nest sur- 
vival was not significantly different between regen- 
eration methods for ... yellow-breasted chat (X2 = 
3.28, df = 1, P= 0.07)." The problem of declaring 
no effect arises especially often when interactions 
are examined. If the interactions are real, even if 
not statistically significant, interpretation of main 
effects is confounded. Yet authors typically provide 
little information about interactions. One of the 
scanned articles in the JWM issue was characteris- 
tic: "[I]nteractions ... were not significant. There- 
fore, we ..." No evidence, not even a P-value, was 
provided to demonstrate that the interactions real- 
ly were negligible and could safely be ignored. 
Scientific versus Statistical Hypotheses 
Robinson and Wainer (2002) state that not all P- 
values are unimportant and refer specifically, if 
obliquely, to Albert Einstein and a hypothesis about 
the speed of light. Without knowing exactly what 
hypothesis RW are referring to, I would suggest that 
it likely represents a scientific, as opposed to a sta- 
tistical, hypothesis. Johnson (1999), among many 
others, also distinguished these kinds of hypothe- 
ses, citing Copernicus' hypothesis that the Earth 
revolves around the sun, in contrast to the hypoth- 
esis widely believed at the time that the sun revolved 
around the Earth. That scientific hypothesis was 
contrasted with the statistical hypotheses typically 
tested in JWM and many other scientific journals. 
Confidence Intervals 
Robinson and Wainer (2002) note that Ander- 
son et al. (2001) recommended the use of a (1 - 
a) confidence interval for portraying the uncer- 
tainty of an estimate, in lieu of P-values. Robinson 
and Wainer suggest that a (1 - a) confidence 
interval is as arbitrary as rejecting or failing to 
reject a null hypothesis based on whether or not 
P < a. It is true that a (1 - a) confidence interval 
gives as much information as knowing whether or 
not P < a. But it gives much more information. 
The width of the confidence interval tells how 
well the parameter has been estimated. The dis- 
tance from the hypothesized value of the para- 
meter to the confidence interval gives a measure 
of the inconsistency of that value with the 
observed data. In contrast to a P-value, a confi- 
dence interval allows the reader to know if lack of 
statistical significance represents lack of effect or 
too small a sample size (Johnson 1999: Fig. 1). 
Further, the clear distinction between confidence 
intervals and significance testing can be seen in 
the realization that one cannot test statistical sig- 
nificance without a null hypothesis, but that con- 
fidence intervals can be obtained without nulls. 
A major advantage of confidence intervals is 
that they allow (and even facilitate) thinking 
"meta-analytically" about effect size and effect 
size replicability across studies (Anderson et al. 
2000, Cumming and Finch 2001). Confidence 
intervals have the additional appeal that they are 
readily amenable to graphical presentation. 
Unfortunately, confidence intervals are too rarely 
reported in many scientific journals. 
APPLICABILITY TO WILDLIFE SITUATIONS 
Some of the arguments made by RW are correct 
but apply to few situations in wildlife science. As 
an example, wildlifers can only envy databases 
like the Cochrane Collaboration, which is based 
on more than 250,000 medical experiments with 
random assignments (presumably of treatments 
to subjects) and for which enough information is 
provided to conduct meta-analyses. We have 
nothing comparable, but instead do as RW 
(2002:265) say: we "rarely replicate results where 
P< 0.05...." 
Robinson and Wainer argue that testing of null 
hypotheses can be useful when attempting to 
determine only the sign of an effect, rather than 
its sign and magnitude. They illustrate this idea 
with a medical research example in which a new 
treatment is compared to an old one. Once a 
treatment has been demonstrated to be superior, 
ethical considerations demand that the inferior 
treatment not be applied to additional subjects. 
The magnitude of the difference between treat- 
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ments is not estimated; knowing the sign of the 
effect is sufficient to make a decision. 
That example is valid but rarely relevant in the 
wildlife field. We generally need to know the 
magnitude, as well as the sign, of an effect. Con- 
sider the hypothesis: if we eliminate sport hunt- 
ing on the North American mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) population, mallard survival rates 
will increase. Probably all of us believe this state- 
ment is true. The real question is: How much will 
survival rates increase? Is the increase in survival 
rate worthwhile compared to the loss of recre- 
ational opportunities? Similarly, we might all 
agree, even without study, that eliminating all ani- 
mals that depredate nests of a species in an area 
will have a positive effect on the nesting success 
of that species there. But this information is not 
enough: we need to know how big that increase 
will be. Predator reduction is expensive and has 
social implications, and a conscientious manager 
wants to know what benefits will result from such 
costly and potentially controversial actions. 
Evolutionary Operation 
Evolutionary operation (EVOP) is proffered by 
RW as a situation in which interest lies only in the 
sign of an effect. As RW note, EVOP is applied in 
industrial settings when slight differences in man- 
ufacturing procedures (temperature, chemical 
inputs, etc.) are made and the direction of the 
effect on the product is noted (Box 1957, Box 
and Draper 1969). Only small changes from cur- 
rent settings are made, so that actual production 
is not compromised. Hence, effects are likely to 
be small, too. Robinson and Wainer note that 
only the direction of the change is important: did 
the quality of the product improve or worsen? 
Box and Draper (1982) provided an overview of 
EVOP. Interestingly, in their examples, they pre- 
sented estimated effects and their standard 
errors, but no P-values or hypothesis tests. Evolu- 
tionary operation is akin to adaptive resource 
management (Walters 1986), which has gained 
increased popularity in wildlife and fisheries 
management. Both methodologies focus on 
learning about the system at the same time the 
system is managed. That is, managers want to 
manipulate inputs to the system to seek optimal 
combinations of those inputs while not varying 
things so much as to cause a serious reduction in 
the output. The major difference between the 
methodologies, in my view, is that natural systems 
have far more uncontrollable, and often unknow- 
able, inputs than do the industrial systems for 
which evolutionary operation was designed. It 
remains to be seen whether adaptive resource 
management will be as successful as evolutionary 
operation has been. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Testing hypotheses is an important component 
of scientific endeavor. Indeed, it is integral to the 
hypothetico-deductive method, which is a power- 
ful way of learning (Romesburg 1981). Key to this 
concept is that the hypotheses being tested are 
scientific, not merely statistical. That is, scientific 
hypotheses address fundamental, global predic- 
tions that derive from theory. Statistical hypothe- 
ses, in contrast, address local questions, usually 
about single populations or systems (Simberloff 
1990), and the null hypotheses usually are mean- 
ingless and known a priori to be false. Most 
hypotheses tested in JWMare statistical in nature, 
not scientific. Wildlife researchers should be 
encouraged to employ scientific hypotheses 
more often and statistical hypotheses less often. 
It is widely acknowledged that virtually all sta- 
tistical null hypotheses are known to be false, 
even before any data are collected or any tests 
conducted (Johnson 1995, 1999; Cherry 1998; 
Anderson et al. 2001). Why then should a signifi- 
cance test be conducted? As it turns out, signifi- 
cance testing can be useful for determining if the 
null hypothesis is approximately true, if the sam- 
ple size is not too small and not too large (Berg- 
er and Delampady 1987). For example, the null 
hypothesis that the means of 2 populations are 
the same (P1 = p2) is almost certainly false in any 
finite population. Nonetheless, the hypothesis 
will be accepted if the sample is too small. The 
hypothesis tl - P2 is much more reasonable to 
consider; how similar the means need to be 
depends on the context. This hypothesis will be 
accepted if the sample is too small and will be 
rejected if the sample is very large, but for mod- 
erate samples, the test can be meaningful. 
Testing null hypotheses is seldom useful or nec- 
essary. The examples cited by RW rarely are ger- 
mane to the wildlife field. The fundamental 
need, as RW mention and as R. A. Fisher empha- 
sized, is for true replication. Researchers and 
managers should not rely on single studies con- 
ducted in a single area even over a few years, but 
instead should require results that are replicated 
by different researchers using a variety of meth- 
ods. As Cohen (1994), Thompson (1996), and 
others have strongly emphasized-contrary to 
common misperceptions-P-values do not reflect 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(2):2002 
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the repeatability of study results; actual replica- 
tions are required to definitively establish 
repeatability. Any single study can yield a P-value, 
but only consistency among replicated studies 
will advance our science. 
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